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In 1949, painter Georgia O’Keeffe donated 101 valuable paintings 
and photographs to Fisk University,1 a prominent and historically 
important African-American university in Nashville, Tennessee.  The 
donated art was part of a larger collection amassed by her late husband, 
Alfred Stieglitz, a prominent artist and collector.2  Stieglitz’s will gave 
O’Keeffe a life estate in his collection,3 which included works by 
Picasso, Cezanne, Renoir, Toulouse-Lautrec, O’Keeffe, Demuth, 
Hartley, Dove and Walkowitz.4  Stieglitz’s will also gave O’Keeffe the 
discretion to distribute the collection to nonprofit organizations of her 
choosing for the purpose of ensuring public access to the paintings to 
promote the study of art.5  At O’Keeffe’s death, any pieces in his 
 
 Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part 
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use, 
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright 
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies. 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  I thank Courtney Brown, Catherine 
McKinney, Francesca Montalvo and Courtney Plavac for their excellent assistance with the 
research for this essay.  I am indebted to Dana Brakeman-Reiser, Laura Cunningham and Stewart 
E. Sterk for their very helpful comments. © 2012 Melanie B. Leslie. 
1 See In re Fisk Univ., No. NF05-2994-III, 2007 WL 4913166 (Tenn. Ch. June 12, 2007). 
2 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). 
3 See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5347750 (Tenn. Ch. Feb. 8, 2008). 
4 The Carl Van Vechten Gallery, FISK U., http://www2.fisk.edu/gallery/ galleries_van_
vechten.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
5 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5.  Stieglitz’s estate included about nine hundred 
works of art, and his will named Georgia O’Keeffe executrix of the estate.  At the time of 
Stieglitz’s death, a New York statute prohibited a testator from giving to charity testamentary 
gifts that consisted of more than half of the estate if a spouse or child survived the testator.  
Stieglitz was survived by a disabled daughter, which raised a question as to whether Stieglitz’s 
will violated that statute.  As part of a settlement agreement, O’Keeffe exercised her power under 
Stieglitz’ will.  The Collection represented less than fifty percent of the value of the estate.  See 
Alan L. Feld, Symposium: The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in the Twenty-First Century, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 873, 882 (2011).  
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collection that she had not donated were to be distributed to nonprofit 
organizations “under such arrangements as will assure to the public . . . 
access thereto to promote the study of art.”6 
O’Keeffe divided Stieglitz’s collection among six institutions: the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Philadelphia Museum of Art, the 
National Gallery of Art in Washington, the Art Institute of Chicago, the 
Library of Congress, and Fisk University.7  The donation to Fisk, a 
small university with no museum experience, was unusual.  In choosing 
Fisk, O’Keeffe was making a strong social statement8—the South was 
racially segregated at that time, and O’Keeffe wanted to ensure that the 
art would be displayed in a place that welcomed both black and white 
members of the public. 
But although she wanted to benefit Fisk, O’Keeffe—like many 
donors before and after—could not bring herself to relinquish complete 
control to the donee. Instead, she imposed a series of restrictions 
designed to ensure both the proper display and care of the art work and 
the creation of a perpetual memorial to Alfred Stieglitz.9  To achieve 
those ends, O’Keeffe stipulated in a series of letters to Fisk’s President 
that the donated art must always be displayed together as one collection 
titled the Alfred Stieglitz Collection (“the Collection”), and that Fisk 
could never sell any piece in the Collection.10  She also required that the 
Collection be housed in as safe a building as possible and kept under 
surveillance at all times when the room was not locked.11  O’Keeffe 
severely limited the University’s ability to loan the artwork, directed 
that no other art work could be shown in the same room as the 
Collection without her consent, prohibited the removal or change of any 
mounting or matting of photographs, and required that the walls of the 
room where the Collection was displayed be painted white or some 
other very light color chosen by O’Keeffe.12  Several years later, 
O’Keeffe donated four paintings from her own collection, including one 
of her own paintings, Radiator Building—Night, New York (“Radiator 
Building”), to Fisk, with the stipulation that the paintings be added to 
the Collection.13 
O’Keeffe appears to have given little, if any, consideration to the 
impact the perpetual restrictions might have decades down the line.  
Like many donors who make restricted gifts, she failed to imagine how 
life might change in the years following her death.  For example, she 
 
6 Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5. 
7 See id. at 6. 
8 See Feld, supra note 5, at 883. 
9 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 6. 
10 See id.  
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 7.  
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does not appear to have contemplated that Fisk might cease to exist; that 
the University might one day lack funds to maintain the Collection; that 
the matting on the photographs might deteriorate; or that she might not 
be around to approve the paint color of the walls.  She gave no guidance 
as to how Fisk should respond to changed circumstances or as to which 
of her objectives—benefitting Fisk, creating a perpetual memorial in 
honor of Stieglitz, keeping the Collection together, prohibiting sale of 
the Collection, and ensuring the Collection remained in the South—
should be given priority in the event that changed circumstances should 
cause them to come into conflict. 14 
 What happened sixty years later was predictable—changed 
circumstances, unforeseen by O’Keeffe, rendered it impossible for Fisk 
to comply with all of the restrictions.  Fisk was on the brink of 
insolvency, and had to choose whether to close the University and 
relinquish the Collection, or find a way to replenish its endowment and 
properly care for the Collection.15  Fisk decided to sell two paintings—
including Radiator Building.16  The Tennessee Attorney General 
approved of the sale, subject to certain conditions, and Fisk, seeking 
court approval, filed an action for a declaratory judgment.17  The 
O’Keeffe Museum of Santa Fe, New Mexico (“the Museum”), and later, 
the Attorney General of Tennessee, intervened to enforce the sale 
prohibition.18  After six years of litigation and two appeals, a chancery 
court granted Fisk permission to sell a fifty percent interest in the 
Collection to the Crystal Bridges Museum in Arkansas for thirty million 
dollars.19  The deal allows Fisk to exhibit the Collection six months of 
every year.20  The payment of thirty million dollars will ensure both that 
Fisk will survive and that it will be able to afford to properly care for 
and exhibit the artwork.21 
Why did resolution of this conflict require six years of litigation 
and the expenditure of enormous amounts of charitable and public 
dollars?  The blame lies with the law itself: the centuries-old doctrine of 
cy pres, which requires courts to determine how the donor would have 
responded to the changed circumstances,22 combined with the law’s lack 
 
14 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d 1. 
15 See id. at 4.  Fisk never intended to sell pieces of the collection to private collectors, but, 
mindful of O’Keeffe’s intent, sought buyers who could ensure that the art remained accessible to 
the public.  It first approached the Frist Center for the Visual Arts, located in Nashville, but the 
museum had no interest in purchasing “ugly art.”  Jennifer Brooks, Fisk University Sought Frist 
Center’s Help with Art, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 14, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16265230. 
16 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 1. 
17 See id. at 4. 
18 See In re Fisk Univ., No. NF05-2994-III, 2007 WL 4913166 (Tenn. Ch. June 12, 2007). 
19 See In re Fisk Univ., No. M2010-02615-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5966893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 29, 2011). 
20 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 5.  
21 Id.  
22 See In re Fisk Univ., 2007 WL 4913166. 
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of clarity about who has standing to speak for the donor,23 practically 
guarantee that years of litigation will ensue when a charity finds itself 
unable to comply with a gift restriction.  In the Fisk case, the law’s 
fuzziness allowed the Museum—an unrelated third party—to make a 
grab for the Collection under the guise of effectuating donor’s intent.  
The fact-specific cy pres standard also enabled the Tennessee Attorney 
General to make it extraordinarily difficult for Fisk to craft a solution 
involving entities located outside the state of Tennessee.  24  Although 
the court ultimately approved Fisk’s contract with the Crystal Bridges 
Museum, that approval came at an extraordinarily high cost. 
The doctrine of cy pres holds that donor’s intent is of paramount 
value. Courts must therefore prioritize effectuation of intent over other 
concerns, such as donees’ present needs or the inefficient use of 
charitable dollars.25  This preoccupation with perpetual enforcement of 
donor intent is justified as necessary to encourage charitable bequests 
and protect donors’ property rights.26  Yet what the law giveth, it taketh 
away: the law’s commitment to donor intent stops short at granting to 
donors standing to enforce the restrictions they create.27  Instead, 
enforcement power is given to the attorneys general of each state.28 
The Fisk litigation is just one of several recent epic battles over 
restricted charitable gifts and changed circumstances,29 but it is 
 
23 See generally Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of 
Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1186 (2007). 
24 See Jonathan Marx, State Wants Say on Fisk Art, TENNESSEAN, April 18, 2007, at 1B, 
available at 2007 WLNR 27536583. 
25 See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1112, 1115 (1993); see also 
In re Fisk Univ., 2007 WL 4913166. 
26 See Feld, supra note 5, at 891; see also Susan N. Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: 
Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 1002 (2010). 
27 See Brody, supra note 23, at 1187. 
28 See id. 
29 In recent years, there have been several high-profile cy pres cases that lasted years and 
consumed millions of dollars of charitable assets. In 2002, three children of Charles and Marie 
Robertson, who donated $35 million to Princeton University to train graduate students in its 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, sued Princeton claiming that 
Princeton “betrayed” the trust that the Robertson’s had placed in it. They alleged that the 
University had spent approximately two hundred million dollars in ways that the donor had not 
originally intended, and that the University had failed to graduate sufficient numbers of students 
who entered government and foreign-service jobs after graduation.  See Maria Newman, 
Princeton University is Sued over Control of Foundation, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 18, 2002, at 5.  
Princeton claimed that the Robertson heirs were distorting the history of the foundation and that 
the heirs “cited materials selectively and out of context to forward their efforts to gain control of 
the funds that Marie and Charles Robertson committed to the support of the graduate program of 
the Woodrow Wilson School.”  Princeton Answers Allegations of Misuse of Robertson Gift, 
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Mar. 15, 2006), http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/ story.jhtml?id
=135500009.  See also Robertson Lawsuit Overview, https://www.princeton.edu/ robertson/about 
(last updated Dec. 16, 2008) (setting forth Princeton’s argument that it had complied with donor’s 
directives).  Six years and over eighty million dollars in legal fees later, the parties settled the 
case.  See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEVEN SCHWARTZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 234 (4th ed. 2010). 
  In another example, millions of dollars were spent over more than a decade as various 
groups of students, neighbors and other individuals sued to stop the Barnes Foundation from 
moving the Museum to downtown Philadelphia in violation of Dr. Barnes’ express directives.  
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important because it neatly illustrates the problems that the law creates 
and highlights the need for legal reform.  After elaborating on this point, 
I examine the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”), which changes cy pres law 
in significant ways.  I show how application of certain UTC provisions 
to the Fisk case would have reduced the length of the litigation and the 
corresponding waste of charitable assets, to some degree.  I then argue 
that further reforms are necessary.  I suggest that perhaps the time has 
come to consider limiting the duration of restrictions on charitable gifts.  
To offset any chilling effect that such a time limit might have on 
charitable giving, we might allow donors and their heirs to enforce 
restrictions during the period of enforceability. 
I. THE STANDING PROBLEM 
Historically, and in most states today, a donor of a restricted gift 
has no standing to enforce the restrictions unless the gift instrument 
reserves to the settlor a right of reversion for breach of a condition.30  
Because reserving a right may render the gift “incomplete,” and thus not 
tax-deductible, donors generally do not create express reversions.31  The 
law’s refusal to recognize donor standing comes from trust law, and 
“derives from a view of the transaction as a property interest—and 
donated property is simply no longer the settlor’s.  Rather, for 
enforcement, trust law looks forward: beneficiaries (who have equitable 
title) have the power to bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty on the 
part of the trustee (who has legal title).”32  State attorneys general 
traditionally have been the only parties with standing to enforce 
restricted gifts. 
But attorneys general face constraints that limit their ability to 
 
See Brody, supra note 23, at 1245. 
30 See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc., v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997 (Conn. 1997) 
(explaining the common-law rule).  Courts have also, from time to time, granted standing to third 
parties who have a “special interest” in the litigation.  Key factors courts consider in determining 
whether to grant special interest standing include: 1) the extraordinary nature of the acts 
complained of and the remedy sought by the plaintiff; 2) whether there was fraud or misconduct; 
3) the effectiveness or availability of the State Attorney General; and 4) the nature of the 
benefitted class and its relationship to the charity.  See Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley & 
David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 61–78 (1993).  See 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959) (“A suit can be maintained for the 
enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General or other public officer, or by a co-
trustee, or by a person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not 
by persons who have no special interest or by the settlors or his heirs, personal representatives or 
next of kin.”); Brody, supra note 23, at 1191. 
31 According to the Internal Revenue Code, a donor may not take a deduction for a charitable 
contribution unless the taxpayer permanently surrenders “dominion and control” over the 
property.  See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A–1(c).  If there is a possibility—not 
“so remote as to be negligible”—that a restricted gift to charity might fail because the donee is 
unable to comply with the conditions, the donor has not surrendered control and the IRS will not 
allow the donor to deduct the gift.  See I.R.C. § 2055 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 20.2055–2(b). 
32 Brody, supra note 23, at 1197.  
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effectively monitor charities’ compliance with gift restrictions.33  Most  
offices have no charities bureau with a separate budget; it is a fair 
question whether scarce public funds should be devoted to holding 
charities accountable for gift restrictions as opposed to, say, fighting 
crime or enforcing state environmental regulations. Even when 
attorneys general are inclined to address problems in the nonprofit 
sector, they are unlikely to focus on whether particular charities are 
honoring the terms of restricted gifts.34  The issues that come to their 
attention tend to involve more egregious breaches of fiduciary duties, 
such as self-dealing or grossly incompetent management.35  And even 
when attorneys general do intervene to enforce restrictions, their 
political interests may conflict with their duty to uphold donative 
intent.36 
As a result, in recent years some sympathetic courts have granted 
standing to donors37 or the heirs of donors’ estates38 to enable them to 
enforce specific restrictions on charitable gifts. 
In these lawsuits, donors are not necessarily seeking return of their 
gifts—they merely want a continuing say in how their charitable 
donations are managed and spent.39  But the cy pres doctrine itself gives 
donors or their estates a second basis on which to make a standing 
argument— and this theory enables them to argue for the return of the 
 
33 See Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 468 (Del. 1991). 
34 See L.B. Research & Educ. Found. v. UCLA Found., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005) (“The Attorney General may not be in a position to become aware of wrongful conduct or 
to be sufficiently familiar with the situation to appreciate its impact, and the various 
responsibilities of his office may also tend to make it burdensome for him to institute legal 
actions except in situations of serious public detriment.”).  
35 See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law 
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004); see also Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of 
Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 623 (1999) (noting 
that even in those states where the Attorney General’s office has an active enforcement division, 
most enforcement efforts occur in response to complaints by whistleblowers or the press). 
36 See Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate 
Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008) (describing how the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s intervention in the proposed Hershey Trust Sale destroyed 
approximately $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth); Brody, supra note 35; MARION R. FREMONT-
SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
327–28, 444 (2004); Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability and the 
Law in Modern American Philanthropy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
37 See UCLA Found., 29 Cal.Rptr. 3d 710. 
38 See Howard v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 986 So. 2d 47 (La. 2008) (holding that 
“would-be heir or legatee” has standing to enforce a restricted gift); Smithers v. St. Luke’s-
Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that widow 
of donor who donated ten million dollars to hospital to establish alcohol rehabilitation center had 
standing to enforce intent of donor where two successive attorneys general filed certificates of 
discontinuance). 
39 See, e.g., Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 
(App. Div. 2001).  For articles exploring the issue of donor standing, see Iris J. Goodwin, Donor 
Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1093 (2005), and Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts 
and Organizations?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (2005) 
(providing that donors have standing to enforce charitable trusts). 
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donated property.  Cy pres doctrine dictates that a failed gift that cannot 
be reformed because the donor lacked a general charitable intent reverts 
to the donor or the donor’s estate.40 In either case, adjudicating whether 
or not a donor or her residuary legatees have standing can add years to a 
cy pres proceeding.41 
In the Fisk case, the lack of clarity surrounding the issue of donor 
standing enabled the Georgia O’Keeffe Museum to argue that it had 
standing to enjoin Fisk’s breach of the sale restriction.  Fisk first raised 
the issue that the Museum lacked standing in objection to the Museum’s 
motion to intervene.42  The Chancellor reserved decision on the standing 
question and granted the Museum’s motion.  Fisk raised the issue again, 
moving for summary judgment to dismiss the Museum from the case.  
In response, the Museum argued simply that it had standing, on behalf 
of O’Keeffe, to enforce the promises Fisk made to her.43 The Chancellor 
ruled in favor of the Museum,44 holding that O’Keeffe was acting in her 
capacity as a life tenant when she made the gift to Fisk, and that the 
Museum, which was the residuary beneficiary of O’Keeffe’s estate, had 
standing as her “successor in interest.”45 
Shortly after, the Museum and Fisk negotiated a settlement 
agreement.  Fisk agreed to sell O’Keeffe’s Radiator Building painting to 
the Museum for $7.5 million in exchange for the Museum’s promise not 
to object to Fisk’s efforts to sell the second painting.46  Note the irony; 
the Museum’s ability to sue Fisk  to enjoin it from selling any painting 
in the Collection gave it the leverage it needed to purchase one of the 
Collection’s most valuable paintings at a deep discount.47 
 
40 See, e.g., Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(rejecting petitioner’s claim that the donor lacked general charitable intent and so the failed gift 
should revert to the donor’s estate); see also Estate of Crawshaw, 249 Kan. 388, 819 P.2d 613 
(1991); Estate of Coleman, 584 P.2d 1255 (Kan. App. 1978); Nelson v. Kring, 225 Kan. 499, 592 
P.2d 438 (1979); Newman, supra note 29. 
41 See, e.g., Howard, 986 So. 2d 47 (litigating standing issue for more than two years). 
42 See Fisk’s Response in Opposition to the Georgia O’Keeffe Foundation’s Expedited Motion to 
Intervene, to Reset Trial, and for a Scheduling Order, In re Fisk Univ., No.05-2994-III, 2006 TN 
App. Ct. Motions LEXIS 3, 2005 TN Ch. Ct. Motions 941870 (Jan. 5, 2006). 
43 See Fisk’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss 
the Museum and Its Counter-Claims, In re Fisk University, No. 05-2994-III, 2006 Tenn. Ct. App. 
Motions LEXIS 4, 2005 Tenn. Ch. Motions 891719 (Aug. 25, 2006). 
44 The court either ruled from the bench or issued an unpublished opinion.  This account is taken 
from Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d 1. 
45 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d 1.  There is support for the Chancery Court’s view 
that the estate of a donor has standing to enforce restrictions imposed by the donor as part of a 
charitable gift.  See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, 723 N.Y.S.2d 
426 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that widow of donor who donated ten million dollars to hospital to 
establish alcohol rehabilitation center had standing to enforce intent of donor to ensure donated 
funds were used for specified purposes); In re Application of Syracuse Univ., 3 N.Y.2d 665, 670 
(N.Y. 1958) (holding that upon frustration of the conditions, the gift reverted to the donor’s heirs 
regardless of whether the donor had expressly retained a reversion). 
46 Ultimately, the Museum also agreed to lend the painting to Fisk for four months every four 
years and to provide a reproduction of Radiator Building to Fisk for display. 
47 As a condition for approving the sale, the Tennessee Attorney General required Fisk to solicit 
donations for a thirty-day period to see if it could raise enough money to keep the painting.  Fisk 
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On September 10, 2007, however, the Chancellor rejected the 
proposed settlement on the ground that it was inconsistent with 
O’Keeffe’s intent.48  The Chancellor also encouraged Fisk to consider 
other cy pres proposals, including one submitted by the Crystal Bridges 
Museum of Arkansas.  On September 28, 2007, Fisk filed a petition to 
amend its complaint to seek court approval of the Crystal Bridges 
proposal on cy pres grounds. 
At this point, the Museum changed tactics.  Instead of continuing 
to seek an injunction to enforce the sale prohibition49 or, better yet, 
bowing out of the case,50 it filed an answer to Fisk’s amended 
complaint, seeking to obtain the entire Collection.  Now that a 
settlement was off the table, the Museum had little to gain by seeking to 
enjoin Fisk from selling two paintings.  Instead, it now argued that 
O’Keeffe lacked the general charitable intent necessary to justify the 
application of the cy pres doctrine, that Fisk could no longer effectuate 
O’Keeffe’s specific intent, and that the Museum, as O’Keeffe’s heirs, 
had an implied reversion in the entire Collection.51  Once again Fisk, 
now joined by the Attorney General, challenged the Museum’s standing 
in a motion for summary judgment.52  On December 21, 2007, the 
Chancellor again held in the Museum’s favor, agreeing that it held an 
implied reversion in O’Keeffe’s estate.53 
The matter dragged on in the Chancery Court for another year and 
a half.  Fisk sought court approval of the Crystal Bridges proposal, but 
the Museum filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 
court could not grant relief on cy pres grounds because O’Keeffe lacked 
general charitable intent.  In February 2008, the court granted the 
 
received offers of twenty to twenty-five million dollars.  The Museum reacted by announcing that 
it would “go back to court” if Fisk even considered the offers.  According to the Museum’s 
president:  
This has never been a question of bidding for the painting.  It’s not being sold.  A 
lawsuit it being settled. . . . This settlement makes it possible for Fisk to receive a 
substantial amount of money . . . and an important painting ends up in what is the 
logical home: the only museum in the world devoted to her work.  
Jonathan Marx, Fisk Can’t Peddle Art, Museum Warns, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 20, 2007, at 1B. 
48 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d 1. 
49 See In re Fisk Univ., No. NF05-2994-III, 2007 WL 4913166 (Tenn. Ch. June 12, 2007). 
50 Oddly, on September 12, 2007, the New York Times reported that the Museum had decided to 
drop its claims, and quotes the Museum’s president, who explained that bowing out of the case 
was “the right thing to do.”  See Theo Emery, Fight Over an O’Keeffe Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/us/12museum.html.  It is not clear whether this 
report is erroneous, or whether the Museum planned to drop out and then changed its mind, 
deciding to go after the entire Collection. 
51  See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5361639 (Tenn. Ch. Mar. 6, 2008) (stating 
that “[t]he claims in this lawsuit have been narrowed to who shall have custody and control of the 
Alfred Stieglitz Collection” and that “the one claim left [is] the counterclaim for reversion filed 
by the [Museum]”). 
52 On November 15, 2007, Fisk filed another motion for summary judgment, demanding that the 
Museum be dismissed for lack of standing.  On December 21, 2007, the court denied Fisk’s 
motion.  See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2007 WL 5877148 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 21, 2007). 
53 See id. 
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Museum’s motion and disapproved the Crystal Bridges proposal.54  
Shortly thereafter the case went to trial on the Museum’s counterclaim 
for a reversion.  On March 6, 2008, the Chancery Court issued its 
decision, finding that Fisk, by its own admission, was unable to care for 
the Collection and thus had breached one of O’Keeffe’s conditions.  But 
in a surprising move, the Chancellor determined that because Fisk had 
recently received $1.6 million in grants and donations, “the 
circumstances [did] not yet justify removing the Collection from 
Fisk.”55  Accordingly, the court imposed a mandatory continuing 
injunction preventing Fisk from selling the Collection; directing Fisk to 
remove the Collection from storage and display it; and providing that 
noncompliance would result in a finding of contempt and forfeiture of 
the Collection.56 
Fisk appealed in July 2009, arguing that 1) the Museum lacked 
standing, and 2) the chancery court erred when it held that O’Keeffe 
lacked general charitable intent.  The appellate court ruled in Fisk’s 
favor on both counts.  The court dismissed the Museum from the case, 
explaining that O’Keeffe had held only a life estate and a special, 
presently exercisable power of appointment in Stieglitz’s collection and 
that therefore any interest she had in the Collection terminated at her 
death.57  The court remanded with instructions to determine whether 
compliance with O’Keeffe’s conditions was impossible or 
impracticable, and if so, to fashion relief that most closely comported 
with O’Keeffe’s intent.58 
Given that O’Keeffe had only a life estate in the Collection, the 
appellate court’s ruling is sound.  But in fairness to the chancery court 
judge, New York standing law59 is quite murky: in one prominent case, 
a court allowed a donor’s heir to sue to enforce the donor’s 
restrictions;60 in another, the court held that a donor’s estate had an 
implied reversion in the donated property that conferred standing on the 
donor’s estate.61  These cases created fertile ground for the Museum’s 
arguments and the judge’s confusion.  The result was an enormous 
waste of charitable dollars. 
 
54 See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5347750 (Tenn. Ch. Feb. 8, 2008). 
55 In re Fisk Univ., 2008 WL 5361639.  
56 See id. 
57 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) . 
58 See id. 
59 The Chancellor determined that New York law applied to the case because Stieglitz’s will was 
probated in New York Surrogate’s Court.  See In re Fisk Univ., No. NF05-2994-III, 2007 WL 
4913166 (Tenn. Ch. June 12, 2007). 
60 See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 281 A.D.2d 127, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. 
Div. 2001) (holding that widow of donor who donated ten million dollars to hospital to establish 
alcohol rehabilitation center had standing to enforce intent of donor). 
61 See Howard v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 986 So. 2d 47, 50 (La. 2008) (holding that 
“would-be heir or legatee” has standing to enforce a restricted gift). 
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II. CY PRES: THE PROBLEM WITH TRYING TO EFFECTUATE INTENT 
The confusion surrounding standing doctrine is not the only 
problem with cy pres proceedings.  Cy pres doctrine itself generates 
enormous expense for little payoff. 
When compliance with the terms of a charitable trust becomes 
impossible or impracticable, the court may reform the trust to best 
enable it to carry out the donor’s general charitable intent.  If, upon 
review, the court finds that the donor manifested only “specific 
charitable intent,” then “the law presumes that the donor would prefer 
the gift to fail rather than to be modified contrary to the specific 
charitable purpose.”62  Although jurisdictions differ over whether a 
restricted gift is held in trust by the donee,63 courts nevertheless apply 
trust law’s cy pres doctrine when a donee of a restricted gift not in trust 
seeks relief from a condition on grounds of changed circumstances.64 
At its core, then, a cy pres proceeding is about defining the course 
of action that the donor would have directed had she anticipated those 
circumstances.  When, as in the Fisk case, the problem involves 
multiple restrictions that have come into conflict with one another, the 
court must determine which conditions or restrictions have priority over 
others.  Because the donor is not available for consultation, the court 
must make an informed guess based on indirect evidence.  This 
infinitely malleable doctrine enables parties to advance their self-
interest under the guise of effectuating donor’s intent.  The result is a 
process that often takes years to resolve and dissipates significant 
amounts of charitable assets and taxpayer dollars. 
Again, the Fisk case is illustrative.  Each of the three parties—the 
Museum, the Tennessee Attorney General, and Fisk University—
painted entirely different pictures about how O’Keeffe would have 
responded to changed circumstances.  Over the years, Fisk applied for 
cy pres relief twice: first when it sought relief from the sale prohibition 
to enable it to find a purchaser for two paintings donated by O’Keeffe,65 
and second, after the Chancellor denied the first petition, to request 
court approval of the sale of a fifty-percent interest in the Collection to 
Crystal Bridges, a motion that the Chancellor also denied.66  The 
Museum and the Attorney General objected to both proposals.67 
 
62 Id. 
63 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) (stating that an unrestricted 
gift to a charity does not create a trust while a gift made for a specific purpose does), with N.Y. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 513 (providing that a donee of a restricted gift is not a trustee).  
64 See, e.g., St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1939) (holding that a charitable 
corporation must abide by gift restrictions unless it obtains cy pres relief from the court). 
65 See In re Fisk Univ., 2007 WL 4913166.  
66 See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5347750 (Tenn. Ch. Feb. 8, 2008). 
67 See In re Fisk Univ., No. M2010-02615-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5966893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 29, 2011).  The Attorney General of Tennessee appealed the court’s approval of the 
settlement agreement between Fisk and Crystal Bridges, “contending that the trial court exceeded 
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First consider the position taken by the Georgia O’Keeffe 
Museum.  The gist of the Museum’s argument was that O’Keeffe would 
have preferred that the Museum take possession of the Collection if Fisk 
failed to comply with any one of the numerous conditions that she 
imposed.68  In other words, the Museum argued that O’Keeffe lacked 
general charitable intent.69  In support of its position, the Museum cited 
various letters written by O’Keeffe to Fisk’s president expressing 
concern that Fisk was not up to the task of caring properly for the 
Collection, and offering to place the Collection elsewhere if Fisk lacked 
the resources to act as custodian.70 
Fisk, on the other hand, argued that O’Keeffe’s choice of Fisk as 
one of six charitable recipients of Stieglitz’s estate was integral to the 
gift.71  O’Keeffe had important reasons for wanting the Collection 
displayed there, and would have agreed to modify the restrictions if 
failure to do so would have caused Fisk to close its doors.72 
To the Tennessee Attorney General, O’Keeffe had one overriding 
goal—to benefit all of the citizens of Tennessee by displaying the 
Collection in Nashville.  In fact, when Fisk first approached the 
Attorney General in 2005 for permission to sell two paintings, the 
Attorney General (at that time, Paul Summers) agreed with little fanfare 
to allow Fisk to violate O’Keeffe’s clear prohibition, on two conditions: 
that Fisk use its best efforts to sell the paintings to Tennessee residents, 
and that Fisk obtain from any buyer a promise to allow public viewings 
of the painting.73  Once the Museum (based in New Mexico) intervened 
in the case, the Attorney General (now Robert Cooper) made an 
unsuccessful attempt to intervene as well.  In February 2007, when Fisk 
and the Museum announced that they had agreed to a settlement which 
allowed the Museum to purchase O’Keeffe’s Radiator Building for 
seven million dollars in exchange for the Museum’s promise not to 
oppose Fisk’s quest to sell the second painting, the Attorney General 
conditioned his approval on Fisk taking thirty days to try to obtain 
sufficient donations to keep the painting.  Fisk received no donations 
during that thirty-day period, but did receive several offers to purchase 
Radiator Building, including one offer of twenty million and another of 
twenty-five million dollars.74  After that, the Attorney General 
 
the scope of remand and that the court erred in determining that the agreement with the Crystal 
Bridges Museum most closely reflects the donor’s intent.”  Id. 
68 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). 
69 See id. at 4. 
70 See id. at 6. 
71 See id. at 17–18. 
72 See id. 
73 Phil Sweetland, Arts, Briefly; Fisk University to Sell O’Keeffe Painting, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 8, 
2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E2DA1031F93BA35751C1A9639C
8B63.   
74 See Jonathan Marx, Fisk Can’t Peddle Art, Museum Warns, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 20, 2007, at 
1B. 
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announced that he could no longer support the Museum-Fisk settlement 
agreement because the purchase price of seven million dollars was too 
low.75 
Not that the Attorney General was interested in allowing Fisk to 
accept one of the twenty-million-dollar offers from out-of-state buyers.  
Instead, in April 2007 the Attorney General again moved to intervene in 
the case because “[t]here [was] no party currently to this proceeding 
representing the interests of the people of Tennessee, who, as 
recognized by the General Assembly, [were] the true charitable 
beneficiaries of Miss O’Keeffe’s charitable gift.”76  After the motion to 
intervene was granted, the Attorney General objected to Fisk’s first cy 
pres proposal on the ground that modification of the restrictions should 
be limited “to changing the location of the Collection from the 
University to another place in Nashville to obtain financial relief for the 
University in maintaining the Collection.”77 
In the Chancellor’s view, one thing was quite clear—O’Keeffe 
viewed Fisk as a custodian of the Collection and had no intention to 
allow the University to benefit financially from its ownership of the 
artwork.78  From this, the Chancellor determined that O’Keeffe lacked 
general charitable intent, and that therefore the cy pres doctrine could 
not resolve the problems caused by changed circumstances.  The 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s determination, emphasizing 
that: 1) Stieglitz’s will authorized O’Keefe to make broad distributions 
to nonprofits (and only to nonprofits); 2) O’Keeffe in fact made 
charitable donations to seven major nonprofit institutions, thereby 
adopting Stieglitz’s charitable intent; and 3) O’Keeffe retained no 
express right to retake possession upon breach of a condition.79 
The appellate court might have also relied on another fact to 
support its determination that O’Keeffe would have preferred a cy pres 
remedy over a reversion to the Museum: O’Keeffe never designated the 
Museum (or the Foundation that preceded it) as the residuary 
beneficiary of her estate.  To explain, the O’Keeffe Foundation, the 
precursor to the Museum, was formed as part of a settlement of a will 
contest over O’Keeffe’s estate.  When O’Keeffe died in 1986, her will 
left the bulk of her estate to John Hamilton, her longtime companion,80 
 
75 See Jonathan Marx, Fisk Can Get Better Deal, Art Pros Say, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 6, 2007, at 
1A.  After the Chancellor rejected the proposed settlement, the Attorney General declared, “It was 
a good deal for the museum.  It was a bad deal financially for Fisk and a bad deal artistically for 
Fisk and a bad deal culturally for the community.”  O’Keeffe Art Sale Halted, CAPITAL TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 2007, at C2. 
76 Jonathan Marx, State Wants Say On Fisk Art, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 18, 2007, at 1B. 
77 In re Fisk Univ., No. NF05-2994-III, 2007 WL 4913166 (Tenn. Ch. June 12, 2007). 
78 See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, 2008 WL 5347750 (Tenn. Ch. Feb. 8, 2008). 
79 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 17–19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). 
80 See id. at 7. 
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and her relatives filed a will contest.81  The settlement agreement 
resolving the contest created the Georgia O’Keeffe Foundation, which 
was designated as the residuary beneficiary of O’Keeffe’s estate.82  In 
March 2006, the Foundation dissolved and transferred its assets to the 
O’Keeffe Museum, which was substituted for the Foundation in the Fisk 
litigation.83 
Not only did O’Keeffe have no part in creating the O’Keeffe 
Foundation; she never even knew of its existence.  If she had had her 
way, Hamilton would have been her residuary beneficiary.  This fact 
further undermines the Museum’s argument that O’Keeffe would have 
preferred to see the gift to Fisk fail and the property revert to the 
Museum. 
One might think that the appellate division’s determinations in 
2009 that the Museum lacked standing and that O’Keeffe manifested 
general charitable intent, along with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 
denial of certification,84 would have marked the beginning of the end of 
the litigation.  Although the appellate court remanded with instructions 
to determine whether Fisk’s compliance with the conditions was 
impossible or impracticable, no party had ever contested that point.  
Accordingly, the court’s only significant remaining task was to fashion 
relief that comported as nearly as possible with O’Keeffe’s specific 
intent. 
The Attorney General, however, changed tactics again.  After 
hailing the opinion as establishing that “neither [Fisk] nor [the Georgia 
O’Keeffe Museum] should be allowed to move the [C]ollection,” he did 
a complete about-face, announcing that he would now oppose Fisk’s 
application for cy pres relief on the ground that Fisk’s compliance with 
O’Keeffe’s conditions was no longer impossible or impracticable.85  As 
evidence, he cited the fact that the Southern Association of Colleges and 
Schools had recently reaccredited Fisk, which it presumably would not 
have done if Fisk was struggling financially.  As the Attorney General 
explained to reporters, “the university can no longer argue that the sale 
of the Collection is necessary to its financial survival.”86 
The Attorney General’s opposition prolonged the litigation for 
more than two additional years. When the Chancellor determined on 
remand that Fisk could not comply with the restrictions,87 the Attorney 
 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 8. 
84 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. (Museum) v. Fisk Univ., M008-00723-SC-R11-CV, 2010 Tenn. 
LEXIS 204 (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). 
85 Jennifer Brooks, Attorney General Says Fisk Has No Right to Sell O’Keeffe Art, TENNESSEAN, 
Feb. 23, 2010.  
86 Id. 
87 See In re Fisk Univ., No. M2010-02615-COA-R3CV, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *4 
(Nov. 29, 2011); see also Brief of Intervenor-Appellee Attorney General & Reporter at 27, In re 
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General continued to oppose Fisk’s efforts to sell an interest in the 
Collection to Crystal Bridges.  As a result, the Chancellor rejected the 
Crystal Bridges offer because, in her view, it deviated too far from 
O’Keeffe’s intent.88  She then gave the Attorney General a deadline for 
submitting alternative proposals.89  He ultimately submitted two, both of 
which involved removing the Collection from Fisk’s custody (for no 
consideration) and placing it in the care of local institutions.90  Crystal 
Bridges then submitted a modified proposal.  At the next hearing, the 
Attorney General argued vigorously against the modified Crystal 
Bridges proposal, changing tactics once again.  He now argued (in the 
hearing as well as in the subsequent appeal) that O’Keeffe’s paramount 
objective was to prohibit the sale of the Collection.  He announced to 
the press that he had a duty to enforce the no-sale provision because to 
do otherwise “could discourage future charitable giving in this state.”91 
This was a complete reversal of the position his office took in 2006 
when it approved the sale of Radiator Building.92   Clearly, the Attorney 
General was willing to take any position to ensure that the Collection 
remained in Nashville. 
Although the Chancellor finally approved the modified Crystal 
Bridges proposal, she ordered Fisk to keep twenty million of the thirty-
million-dollar sale price in an endowment for the sole purpose of taking 
care of the Collection.93  Fisk appealed this requirement, and the 
Attorney General appealed the Chancellor’s approval of the Crystal 
Bridges proposal.  Finally, in 2011, the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
settled the issue once and for all by affirming the Chancery Court’s 
approval of the Crystal Bridges proposal but reversing its directive that 
Fisk must use twenty million dollars of the proceeds for maintaining the 
Collection.94 
The Attorney General’s position—that the donor cared most about 
benefitting the local citizenry—is one that Attorneys Generals 
frequently take in cy pres litigation.95  But, as Evelyn Brody has 
 
Fisk Univ., No. M2010-02615-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2006328 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2011). 
88 In re Fisk Univ., 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *4. 
89 Id. 
90 The first proposal would have created a public and private partnership between the State of 
Tennessee, the Frist Center for the Visual Arts, and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville 
and Davidson County. The partnership would have taken custody of the Collection until Fisk had 
the financial ability to resume its role as custodian. Pursuant to the second proposal, Fisk alumna 
Carol Creswell-Betsch would establish an endowment fund to “benefit, in perpetuity, the display 
and care of the Alfred Stieglitz Collection at the Van Vechten Gallery at Fisk University.” In re 
Fisk Univ., 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *6. Fisk would have received no money for 
relinquishing the Collection. The Chancellor rejected both proposals. See id. at *4–7. 
91 Jennifer Brooks, AG Unveils Plan to Keep Fisk Art in Nashville, TENNESSEAN, Sept. 10, 2010 
at 1A. 
92 Id. at *23. 
93 See id. at 19. 
94 See In re Fisk Univ., 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641. 
95 See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 36, at 758 (“[E]ven if the Attorney General does intervene in 
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emphasized, charitable assets do not necessarily “belong” to the state in 
which the charity is located;96 an attorney general’s proper objective is 
to enforce charitable intent and fiduciary duties rather than to represent 
the state’s pecuniary interests.  Unfortunately, the cy pres doctrine is 
sufficiently malleable that an attorney general can always invoke donor 
intent to argue for a remedy or solution that would benefit the people of 
his or her state. 
III. RECENT REFORMS: THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE 
The Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) has taken some significant steps 
to modify the legal regime to reduce litigation over changed 
circumstances.  Although the UTC, by its terms, applies only to 
charitable trusts, it will no doubt influence how courts apply the cy pres 
doctrine to restricted gifts.  The UTC makes a few radical changes to 
charitable trust doctrine: section 413, which codifies the cy pres 
doctrine, creates a conclusive presumption that the donor possessed a 
general charitable intent and broadens the grounds for applying cy 
pres.97  Specifically, it provides that “if compliance with the terms of a 
trust becomes illegal, impossible, impracticable or wasteful,” the trust 
shall not fail, and the court shall apply the cy pres doctrine to fashion 
relief that comports as closely as possible with the testator’s intent.  
Section 405(c) states simply that the donor of a charitable trust has 
standing to enforce its terms.98  Taken together, the UTC has the 
 
the administration of a charitable trust, the intervention might be designed to promote the 
Attorney General’s political interests rather than the trust’s charitable purpose.  Indeed, the 
Attorney General’s intervention in this instance preserved agency costs within the Trust on the 
order of roughly $850 million.”); Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and 
Charity Autonomy: How Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 573 n. 1 
(2010) (stating that in 2008, Republican Governor Matt Blunt of Missouri tried to compel a 
private Missouri foundation to use 80 percent of its grant budget to support underfunded state 
health care programs because the charitable assets “belong to Missouri taxpayers.”). 
96 Brody & Tyler, supra note 95, at 580. 
97 UTC section 413 in its entirety reads: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if a particular charitable purpose 
becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful: 
(1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part; 
(2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor’s successors in interest; 
and 
(3) the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the 
trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with 
the settlor’s charitable purposes. 
(b) A provision in the terms of a charitable trust that would result in distribution of the 
trust property to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails over the power of the court under 
subsection (a) to apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust only if, when the 
provision takes effect: 
(1) the trust property is to revert to the settlor and the settlor is still living; or 
(2) fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the date of the trust’s creation. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (2005) (emphasis added). 
98 UTC section 405(c) provides: “The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a 
proceeding to enforce the trust.”  The comments to that section state: “Contrary to Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 391 (1959), subsection (c) grants a settlor standing to maintain an action to 
enforce a charitable trust.  The grant of standing to the settlor does not negate the right of the state 
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potential to alter the landscape of cy pres litigation—especially if courts 
are willing to extend its scope to restricted gifts not in trust. 
 Consider how the Fisk litigation might have unfolded if the UTC 
had been enacted in Tennessee when Fisk sought to sell the two 
paintings and the Chancery Court had determined that the provisions 
should apply to restricted gifts.  First, the Museum could not have 
argued that it had an implied reversion in the paintings.  Its only avenue 
for establishing standing would have been to argue that it had succeeded 
to O’Keefe’s right to standing under section 405(c).  Because section 
405(c) does not expressly state whether donor standing extends to a 
donor’s estate, that issue might have provoked some litigation.  But 
even if the Museum had succeeded in convincing the court to extend to 
it donor standing as O’Keefe’s residuary beneficiary, it would have 
given rise only to an action to enforce the prohibition on sale by 
injunction.  As in the actual case, the Museum would have had some 
leverage to convince Fisk to settle.  However, once the Chancery Court 
rejected the proposed settlement, there would have been no reason for 
the Museum to continue with the case because it would have had no 
ground to argue that the Collection should revert to it.  The Museum 
would have likely pulled out of the litigation in 2007, two years before 
the appellate division dismissed its petition for lack of standing. 
The Attorney General, however, would still have had the power to 
object to any cy pres proposal that involved a party from a state other 
than Tennessee.  And given his desire to keep the property in 
Tennessee, it might have taken a year or two to fashion an appropriate 
cy pres remedy.  The changes to the UTC, however positive, would not 
entirely prevent fruitless and expensive litigation over the intent of a 
donor who made a gift sixty years earlier. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER REFORM 
The reforms implemented in the UTC are good ones. I advocate 
extending their reach to apply to restricted gifts.  But further reform is 
necessary. The time has come to consider a legal rule limiting the 
duration of restrictions on charitable donations.  A time limitation—of, 
say, forty years—would enable donors to direct the use of charitable 
assets for a reasonable period but greatly reduce litigation over changed 
circumstances and the accompanying  waste of charitable and public 
dollars.  The law should clearly grant standing to donors or their heirs to 
enforce the restrictions during the period of enforceability, and the cy 
pres doctrine would apply if the charity argued that changed 
circumstances rendered compliance impossible or impracticable.  But 
 
attorney general or persons with special interests to enforce either the trust or their interests.”  Id. 
§ 405 & cmts. 
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after that point, a charity that finds itself unable to comply with 
restrictions should be able to change course as necessary, bound only by 
its fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and obedience to mission—duties 
that an attorney general will still have the power to enforce.  Because 
charities need to compete for charitable dollars, reputational concerns 
will pressure charities to depart from donor intent only in those 
instances where deviation is necessary to enable the charity to 
accomplish its broader mission. 
There are two possible objections to this idea, neither of which is 
terribly persuasive.  First, some might argue (and indeed, many people 
have advanced this argument in conversation) that the ability to restrict 
the use of property in perpetuity is one stick in the bundle of rights and 
deserves protection for that reason alone.  But to suggest that property 
ownership carries with it the unfettered right to control property after 
death is simply wrong as a descriptive matter.  The law is replete with 
examples of limits that courts and legislatures have placed on this 
“right.”  To consider some obvious examples: first, the Internal 
Revenue Service imposes gift and estate taxes on estates exceeding a 
specified value.  This quite clearly frustrates some property owners’ 
ability to control the disposition of a percentage of their assets after 
death. Second, most states constrain married property owners from 
disinheriting their spouses, no matter how badly they may want to.99  
Third, many states place limits on the duration of private trusts, to avoid 
the problems that stem from a donor’s poor foresight.100  Fourth, many 
courts decline to enforce testamentary provisions requiring the 
destruction of property.101  Fifth, courts will not enforce total 
restrictions on alienation.102  I could go on, but the point is clear.  The 
question is not whether the state may place restrictions on a property 
owner’s right to direct the disposition of assets after death, but when are 
those limitations justified. In my view, limiting the duration of 
restrictions could be justified as necessary to curb the enormous waste 
of charitable and public dollars that occur under the current unworkable 
legal regime. 
The second objection one might raise is that perpetual enforcement 
of restricted gifts is necessary to encourage charitable giving.  My 
 
99 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.203 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-202 (2008); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 45a-436(a) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-203 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
6a203 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 191 § 15 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-203 (2002); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 72-2-222 (2007); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS §5-1.1-A (McKinney 2012); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (1996 & Supp. 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (2009); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-203 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-203 (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-3-1 (2004). 
100 See, e.g, ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-3-101 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE §21200 (West 2011); CONN. 
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instinct is that limiting the duration of restrictions would have no 
significant chilling effect.  For one thing, many philanthropists are more 
motivated by altruism than by ego. For those who need a push, the tax 
code, with its charitable income and estate tax deductions, probably 
does more to incentivize charitable giving than the promise of donor 
control.  Moreover, those donors who truly care about deadhand control 
may be reassured by the promise that they—or their heirs, if they should 
die before the restrictions expire—will have standing to enforce the 
restrictions during the period of enforceability. This increase in control 
might act as a counterweight to any disincentive that time limits on 
enforceability might create. 
I am not the first scholar to argue that cy pres doctrine should be 
reformed.103  But up to now, reform—to the extent it has occurred at 
all—has proceeded at a glacial pace.  The result is that exorbitant 
amounts of charitable and public dollars are wasted each year as heirs, 
attorneys general, and third parties to go war with charities over the 
meaning of restrictions and how donors might have responded to 
changed circumstances.  As the Fisk litigation demonstrates, the law’s 
murkiness will ensure that this waste continues.  The time has come to 
reassess whether allowing unlimited control is worth the price. 
 
 
103 See, e.g., John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted Charitable Gifts, 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2010); Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: 
Principled Practice to Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 97 (2007); Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do for You: Robertson v. 
Princeton Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 75, 102 (2009); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should 
Not Curb Board Discretion over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 701 (2005); Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1112 (1993). 
